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GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES: THE DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE UNDER THE
NATIONAL VS. INTERNATIONALIZED CONTEXT
– WHAT IS SOVEREIGN TO ONE IS NOT
SOVEREIGN TO THE OTHER
VERONICA MINA†

In Gamble v. United States,1 the Supreme Court addressed
whether to overrule a longstanding interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no
person may be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.2 The
Court adhered to longstanding precedent and held that a crime under
one sovereign’s laws is not “the same offense” as a crime under the
laws of another sovereign.3 The Court incorrectly held that the “dualsovereignty” doctrine was constitutional in the United States, where a
state may prosecute a defendant under state law even if the federal
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government already prosecuted him for the same conduct under a
federal statute, or vice versa because the state government is not
sovereign.4 Additionally, the Court incorrectly explained that “dual
sovereignty” analogously applies in the international context as it
does in the United States domestic context because the Court
misplaced the views and roles of jurisdiction and sovereignty in
international law for purposes of prosecution.5
I. THE CASE
In November 2015, a police officer in Mobile, Alabama pulled
Terance Gamble over for a damaged headlight.6 The police officer
smelled marijuana so he searched Gamble’s car, where he found a
loaded 9-mm handgun.7 Gamble was previously convicted of
second-degree robbery. Therefore, his possession of the handgun
violated an Alabama law providing that no one convicted of “a crime
of violence”8 “shall own a firearm or have one in his or her
possession.”9 Gamble pleaded guilty to the possession of a handgun
in violation of Alabama law. Afterward, federal prosecutors indicted
him for the same instance of possession under a federal law.10 The
federal law forbade those convicted of “a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport
in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition.”11
Gamble moved to dismiss the federal indictment on the ground
that it was for “the same offense” as the one at issue in his state
conviction and thus exposed him to double jeopardy.12 The District
Court denied Gamble’s motion to dismiss.13 Gamble then pleaded
guilty to the federal offense while preserving his right to challenge
4. See infra Section IV.A.
5. See infra Section IV.B.
6. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963.
7. Id.
8. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-70(2) (2015) (defining “crime of violence” to include
robbery).
9. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(a) (2015)).
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
12. Id.
13. See United States v. Gamble, No. 16-00090-KD-B, 2016 WL 3460414 (S.D. Ala.
June 21, 2016) (explaining that we have here two sovereignties, deriving power from
different sources . . . It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by
each (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))).
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the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds.14 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.15 Gamble appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted Gamble’s petition for certiorari to
determine whether to overturn the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.16
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prevents persons from being put in
jeopardy of prosecution twice for substantially the same crime.17 The
relevant part of the Fifth Amendment states, “No person shall . . . be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
. . . .”18 Section II.A discusses the elements of the Dual Jeopardy
Clause and its general applicability.19 Section II.B discusses the
purpose and origin of the Fifth Amendment through doctrinal
applications.20 Section II.C examines jurisdiction as a prior constraint
to exercising sovereignty.21
Section II.D examines the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine.22
A. The Elements of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its
Applicability
The bar against double jeopardy applies if three elements are
met. The first two elements determine “former” jeopardy, which is a
prerequisite to “double” jeopardy.23 When “former” jeopardy is
assumed or established, the third element determines “double”
jeopardy.24 First, jeopardy had previously attached.25 Second,

14. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
15. See United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(explaining that “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent different sovereigns (i.e., a
state government and the federal government) from punishing a defendant for the same
criminal conduct” (citing United States v. Bidwell, 393 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2004))).
16. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. See infra Section II.A.
20. See infra Section II.B.
21. See infra Section II.C.
22. See infra Section II.D.
23. State v. Corrado, 81 Wash. App. 640, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975) (explaining that an accused must suffer jeopardy
before he can suffer double jeopardy)).
24. Id.
25. State v. Goldsmith, 147 Wash. App. 317, 323 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v.
Corrado, 81 Wash. App. 640, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)).
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jeopardy is terminated.26 Third, the defendant is placed in jeopardy
again for the same offense.27
The first element requires that jeopardy previously attached.28 In
order for jeopardy to attach, a defendant must risk a determination of
guilt.29 A plea of double jeopardy requires that the accused must
have been put in jeopardy.30 For example, a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to hold an accused for an action is not a trial.31 Therefore, the
accused is not put in jeopardy and his or her discharge as a result of
such a hearing does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the offense
that gave rise to the preliminary hearing.32 Additionally, a showing
of unfairness alone cannot invoke double jeopardy protection.33 The
rule of double jeopardy is applicable only when the first prosecution
involves a trial before a criminal court or at least a court empowered
to impose punishment by way of fine, imprisonment, or otherwise as
a deterrent to the commission of a crime.34 Therefore, administrative
penalties, such as non-criminal lawyer disciplinary proceedings35 and
the suspension of a driver’s license,36 do not constitute criminal
sanctions or “punishment,” and double jeopardy does not bar further
proceedings.37
The second element requires that jeopardy is
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 25.
29. Odem v. State, 175 Md. App. 684, 700 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (citing Serfass v.
United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975) (stating “[A] defendant does not risk a
determination of guilt when a trial court determines a preliminary matter without reaching
the merits of the case.”)).
30. Wampler v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 231 Md. 639, 647–48 (Md. 1963).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Lloyd v. State, 42 Md. App. 167, 172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (rebutting
defendant’s argument that since one of the policies behind the double jeopardy concept is
that the government act with fundamental fairness, we should find that he has been placed in
double jeopardy if we find he has been treated unfairly).
34. In re John P., 311 Md. 700, 708 (Md. 1988) (“When no sanctions of a criminal
nature are sought by the State in either the first or the second proceeding, it would seem that
the double jeopardy prohibition is inapplicable.”).
35. Md. State Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 535 (Md. 1974) (explaining that
the principles of double jeopardy or res judicata are no bar to a disciplinary proceeding
which follows the disposition of a criminal indictment, though based on substantially the
same conduct).
36. State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 265 (Md. 1995) (explaining that the remedial purpose
of maintaining safety on the public highways amply justifies the maximum 45-day license
suspension that the statute may impose upon a driver who fails blood or breath alcohol test,
so that suspension does not constitute “punishment” and driver subsequently may be
convicted of driving while intoxicated without violating double jeopardy principles).
37. See also Ward v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 339 Md. 343, 350 (Md. 1995)
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previously terminated.38 The Double Jeopardy Clause applies only if
there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the
original jeopardy.39 The Supreme Court has held that the failure of
the jury to reach a verdict, such as in the case of a hung jury or a
mistrial, is not an event which terminates jeopardy.40
In further determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Federal Constitution applies, two questions must be resolved:
first, whether both tribunals before which the defendant was tried
derived their authority and jurisdiction from the same sovereign, and
second, whether both prosecutions were for the same offense.41 The
express prohibition of double jeopardy for the same offense means
that wherever such prohibition is applicable, either by operation of
the Constitution or by action of Congress, no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.42
First, if a person is tried for an offense in a tribunal deriving its
jurisdiction and authority from the United States, and is acquitted or
convicted, he cannot again be tried for the same offense in another
tribunal deriving its jurisdiction and authority from the United
States.43 Second, the same acts constituting a crime against the
United States cannot, after the acquittal or conviction of the accused
in a court of competent jurisdiction, be made the basis of a second
trial of the accused for that crime in the same or in another court,
civil or military, of the same government.44 However, the United
States Supreme Court in Grafton v. United States45 acquiesced to the
principle that an offense against the United States can only be
punished under its authority and in the tribunals created by its laws;
whereas, an offense against a state can be punished only by its
authority and in its tribunals.46 The same act may constitute two
(holding that disciplinary sanctions imposed on correctional employees under Division of
Correction regulations are remedial in nature, not punitive, and thus, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply).
38. See supra note 26.
39. Richardson v. U.S., 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984).
40. Id. at 325-26 (explaining that the “ends of justice would otherwise be defeated,” as
the government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the
jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to
agree).
41. United States v. Vaughan, 491 F.2d 1096, 1097 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Harlow v.
United States, 301 F.2d 361, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1962)).
42. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 351–52 (1907).
43. Id. at 352.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 354.
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offenses, one against the United States and the other against a state.47
B. Understanding the Purpose and Origin of the Fifth
Amendment Through A Doctrinal View of The Double
Jeopardy Clause
Notwithstanding the doctrinal history, the history that led to the
inception of the Double Jeopardy Clause is important.48 The Senate
favored adopting the traditional language, ‘jeopardy,’ which was
adopted by the Conference Committee and approved by both Houses
with no apparent dissension.”49 The idea of double jeopardy has its
origins in a lengthy common-law history, specifically through ancient
Greek and Roman laws.50 In the 17th century, Lord Coke described
the protection afforded by the principle of double jeopardy as a
function of three related common-law pleas: autrefois acquit (already
acquitted of the same offense), autrefois convict (already convicted of
the same offense), and pardon.51 With some exceptions, these pleas
could be raised to bar the second trial of a defendant if he could prove
that he had already been convicted of the same crime.52 Blackstone
later used the ancient term “jeopardy” in characterizing the principle
underlying the two pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.53
He wrote that “jeopardy” signified a “universal maxim of the
common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy
of his life more than once for the same offense.”54 The principle of
double jeopardy is often referred by its Latin name, non bis in idem
or ne bis in idem – “not twice for the same thing,”55 deriving from the
Roman maxim nemo bis vexari pro una et eadam causa, “no man

47. Id.
48. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340–42 (1975) (“At the time of the first
Congress, only one state had a constitutional provision embodying anything resembling a
prohibition against double jeopardy. In the course of their ratification proceedings, however,
two other States suggested that a double jeopardy clause be included among the first
amendments to the Federal Constitution. Apparently attempting to accommodate these
suggestions, James Madison added a ban against double jeopardy to the proposed version of
the Bill of Rights that he presented to the House of Representatives in June 1789. Madison’s
provision read: ‘No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than
one punishment or one trial for the same offense.’” (citing 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789))).
49. S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 71, 77, 87–88 (1820); H.R. JOUR. 1st Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 (1826).
50. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 340.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 3 E. Coke, Institutes 212–13 (6th ed. 1680)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *335–36).
55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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shall be twice vexed or tried for the same cause.”56
After the Double Jeopardy clause was adopted, its doctrinal
application refined its purpose and meaning further. The Supreme
Court first considered the Fifth Amendment’s “twice put in jeopardy”
clause in Respublica v. Shaffer.57 The Court explained that by
questioning the competency of a court’s verdict or a unanimous jury
verdict, the judicial system would necessarily introduce the
oppression of a double trial.58
Several decades later, the Supreme Court continued to uphold
the Double Jeopardy Clause in Ex parte Lange.59 The Court
emphasized that, “[i]f there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of
England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully
punished for the same offense.”60 In examining the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment, the Court explained that, “For of what avail is the
constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be
any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?”61 Justice
Miller further explained that the issue is not the danger or jeopardy of
being found guilty a second time, but rather it is the punishment that
would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger
guarded against by the Constitution.62
56. See Gerard Conway, Ne bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217
(2003).
57. 1 U.S. 236 (Pa. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer, 1788).
58. Id. at 236–37 (“It is a matter well known, and well understood, that by the laws of
our country, every question which affects a man’s life, reputation, or property, must be tried
by twelve of his peers; and that their unanimous verdict is, alone, competent to determine the
fact in issue. If them, you undertake to enquire, not only upon what foundation the charge is
made, but, likewise, upon what foundation it is denied, you will, in effect, usurp the
jurisdiction of the Petty Jury, you will supersede the legal authority of the court, in judging
of the competency and admissibility of witnesses, and, having thus undertaken to try the
question, that question may be determined by a bare majority, or by a much greater number
of your body, than the twelve peers described by the law of the land.”).
59. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
60. Id. at 164, 168 (“The principle finds expression in more than one form in the
maxims of the common law. In civil cases the doctrine is expressed by the maxim that no
man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. It is upon the foundation of this maxim that the plea of a former judgment for
the same matter, whether it be in favor of the defendant or against him, is a good bar to an
action.”); see also Crenshaw v. The State of Tennessee, 8 Tenn. 122 (Mart. & Yer. 1827)
(holding that a conviction, judgment, and execution upon one indictment for a felony not
capital is a bar to all other indictments for felonies not capital, committed previous to such
conviction, judgment, and execution).
61. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 173.
62. Id. But see Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1986) (“The prohibition is not
against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused,
whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial.”).
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Additionally, the purpose of the Fifth Amendment represents a
constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit in federal
criminal proceedings.63 In United States v. Jorn,64 the defendant was
prosecuted for willfully assisting in the preparation of false and
fraudulent tax returns for a taxpayer.65 The Supreme Court opposed
allowing the government to subject the individual to repeated
prosecutions for the same offense, as this would cut deeply into the
framework of procedural protections that the Constitution establishes
for the conduct of a criminal trial.66 The Court took the stance that
the policy underlying the Fifth Amendment is to save individuals
from embarrassment, expense, ordeal, and a continuous state of
anxiety.67
C. Jurisdiction as a Prior Issue to Exercising Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty relies on the understanding of proper
jurisdiction. “Sovereignty,” for double jeopardy purposes, means the
legal concept of jurisdiction – specifically, independent jurisdiction
to prescribe, or to make and apply, law. This prescriptive jurisdiction
in turn authorizes independent jurisdiction to enforce that law
through a separate prosecution. Exercise of independent jurisdiction
by either federal or state government must satisfy due process under
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.68
A state’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction must satisfy
constitutional tests that consider, among other things, the degree of
contacts between the forum, the parties and the occurrence,69 the
interests of the forum,70 and the reasonable expectations of the

63. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
64. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
65. Id. at 470.
66. Id. at 479 (explaining that society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain that a
criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit
the government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws).
67. Id. (“The state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting the
person to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal, and compelling the person to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent the person may be found guilty.”).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 334 (1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
70. Hague, 449 U.S. at 318.
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parties,71 in order both to protect defendants and to ensure that states
“do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status
as coequal sovereigns.”72 Other relevant factors include the efficient
resolution of controversies, orderly administration of law, and shared
substantive policies within a system of multiple sovereigns.73
At its root, jurisdiction means, “the speaking of law.”74 The key
to ascertaining dual sovereigns “turns on whether the two prosecuting
entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct
sources of power.”75
Framed in the Supreme Court’s dual
sovereignty language, prescriptive jurisdiction represents (1) the
power “to determine what shall be an offense,”76 and adjudicative and
enforcement jurisdiction represents; and (2) the power “to punish
such offenses.”77 Where an entity has an independent prescriptive
jurisdiction, it is functionally a “sovereign” as envisaged by the dual
sovereignty doctrine – it independently may determine what shall be
an offense, and may marshal its adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction to punish that offense.78 Since the state government and
the federal government – as distinct lawgivers – enjoy distinct
prescriptive jurisdictions to make and apply distinct laws, distinct
prosecutions would be permissible. However, this concept of
jurisdiction becomes significantly more complicated in the
international sphere.79
D. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine: Application of the
Blockburger Test
To determine whether the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine applies,
the courts look at the elements of each statute, where each of the
offenses require proof of a different element.80 The applicable rule is
as follows—where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the court looks to the difference
71. Id.
72. Id. at 334 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–94 (1980)).
73. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Asahi
Metal Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987).
74. Costas Douzinas, The Metaphysics of Jurisdiction, in JURISPRUDENCE OF
JURISDICTION 22 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).
75. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); see infra Section IV.A.
76. Heath, 474 U.S. at 89–90.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See infra Section IV.B.
80. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
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between the two statutes as it pertains to the pertinent facts.81 The
test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same
act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.82
An offense is determined by the applicability of the underlying law.83
The first true full application of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
in the United States was in 1922 in United States v. Lanza.84 In
violation of the National Prohibition Act, the defendants were
charged with manufacturing intoxicating liquor, the second with
transporting it, and the third with possessing it.85 The State of
Washington turned around and charged the same defendants with
manufacturing, transporting, and having in possession the same
liquor under its own state statute.86 The defendants claimed that the
two punishments for the same act constitute double jeopardy under
the Fifth Amendment.87
In dismissing the defendants’ claims, the Supreme Court
explained that in determining what is an offense against its peace and
dignity, each government exercises its own sovereignty, not that of
the other.88 Furthermore, the Court emphasized that an act denounced
as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense
against the peace and dignity of both and therefore may be punished
by both.89 In the case of Lanza, the same act was an offense against
the state of Washington, because the offense violated one of its state
laws, and also an offense against the United States under the National
Prohibition Act.90
Thus, the Court held that the defendants
committed two different offenses by the same act, and a conviction
by a Washington court against the state is not a conviction of the
different offense against the United States, and so is not double
jeopardy.91 In the first true application of the dual sovereignty
81. Id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)); see also
Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (Mass. 1871) (“A single act may be an offense
against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other.”).
82. Morey, 108 Mass. at 434.
83. See supra note 82.
84. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
85. Id. at 378–79.
86. Id. at 379.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 382.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.

MINA (DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/21 1:17 PM

2020] DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE NAT’L VS. INT’L CONTEXT

265

doctrine, the Court explicitly employed the concept of jurisdiction –
and, more specifically, independent prescriptive jurisdiction to
determine offenses – to justify its holding.92
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed
whether a State in the United States may prosecute a defendant under
state law even if the Federal Government prosecuted him for the
same conduct under a federal statute, or vice versa.93 Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that
double jeopardy did not prohibit the federal government from
prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct that the State of Alabama
prosecuted him for, and thus upheld the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.94
He explained that under the principles of stare decisis,95 the Clause’s
text coupled with 170 years of precedent and other historical
evidence, did not persuade the Court to overturn that precedent.96
The Court began its analysis by examining the language of the
Double Jeopardy Clause and acquiescing to the notion that there are
two sovereigns in the United States – the federal sovereign and each
state sovereign.97 Justice Alito clarified that the language of the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects individuals from being twice put in
jeopardy “‘for the same offense,’ not for the same conduct or
actions.”98 By clarifying the language of the Clause, Justice Alito
explained that, as the term was originally understood, a law defines
an “offense,” and a sovereign defines each law.99 Therefore, where
92. Id. (“We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory. Each may,
without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no
legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment.”).
93. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1963–64 (2019).
94. Id. at 1964; See United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x. 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017).
95. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1981 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court
currently views stare decisis as a “‘principle of policy’” that balances several factors to
decide whether the scales tip in favor of overruling precedent (citing Citizens United v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010))); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on
judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.”).
96. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1969 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 1966.
98. Id. at 1965 (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990)).
99. Id. (citing Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia J., dissenting) (“If the same conduct
violates two or more laws, then each offense may be separately prosecuted.”)); see Moore v.
Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 17 (1852) (“The constitutional provision is not, that no person shall be
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there are two sovereigns, there are two laws, and two “offenses.”100
Then the Supreme Court discussed the interests each sovereign
has in punishing the same act.101 For instance, an assault on a United
States marshal would offend the Nation and a state – the Nation by
hindering the execution of legal process, and the state by breaching
the peace of the State.102 Justice Alito cited additional support from
the international sphere to emphasize the interests that separate
sovereigns have in punishing conduct which violates each
sovereign’s own laws.103 In the majority’s view, if a United States
national was murdered in another country, that country could
rightfully seek to punish the killer for committing an act of violence
within its territory.104 Additionally, the United States looks at the
same conduct and sees an act of violence against one of its nationals,
a person under the particular protection of its laws.105 Therefore, in
Justice Alito’s view, customary international law allows exercise of
jurisdiction permitting prosecution in American courts for the killing
of an American abroad.106 Moreover, Justice Alito recognized that
that Americans may lack confidence in the competency or honesty of
foreign legal systems, or less cynically, Americans may think that
special protection for United States nationals serves key national
interests related to security, trade, commerce, or scholarship.107
While the majority acquiesces to the fact that “the Republic is
‘one whole,’”108 it makes a distinction between “the whole” and a
single part.109 Holdings like McCulloch v. Maryland, asserting that a
subject, for the same act, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; but for the same offense,
the same violation of law, no person’s life or limb shall be twice put in jeopardy.”).
100. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965.
101. Id. at 1966 (explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause does more than honor the
formal difference between two distinct criminal codes, it honors the substantive differences
between the interests that two sovereigns can have in punishing the same act).
102. Id. at 1966–67 (reasoning that the duality of harm explains how ‘one act’ could
constitute “two offenses, for each of which the offender is justly punishable”).
103. See supra note 102.
104. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (explaining that the foreign country’s interest lies in
protecting the peace in that territory rather than protecting the American specifically).
105. Id. (“The murder of a U.S. national is an offense to the United States as much as it is
to the country where the murder occurred and to which the victim is a stranger.”).
106. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a)(1)).
107. Id. (recognizing that such interests might also give us a stake in punishing crimes
committed by United States nationals abroad – especially crimes that might do harm to our
national security or foreign relations); see, e.g., § 2332a(b).
108. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1968 (citing Ginsburg, J., dissenting, at 1990).
109. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion) (noting that in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
distinguished precisely between “the people of a State: and “the people of all States;”
between the “sovereignty which the people of a single state possess” and the sovereign
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state may not tax the national bank, recognize that states and the
Nation have different “interests” and “rights.”110 Although the
American Constitution rests on the principle that the people are
sovereign, Justice Alito argues that does not mean that the people
have conferred all the attributes of sovereignty on a single
government.111 In fact, when the original States declared their
independence, the Constitution limited but did not abolish the
sovereign powers of the States, which retained “a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty.”112 Therefore, according to the majority,
because the Federal Government and the States wield sovereign
powers, the American system of government is one of “dual
sovereignty.”113
In rebutting the dissent’s opinion that the division of federal and
state power was meant to promote liberty and thus not expose
Gamble to a second sentence,114 Justice Alito emphasizes that because
the powers of the Federal and State government often overlap, there
are two layers of regulation.115 Similarly, it is not uncommon for the
Federal Government to permit activities that a State chooses to forbid
or heavily restrict, such as gambling and selling alcohol.116
Therefore, while the majority agrees that the system of federalism is
fundamental to the protection of liberty, the system does not always
maximize individual liberty at the expense of other interests.117
Justice Alito ultimately ends his opinion explaining that an “offense”
for double jeopardy purposes is defined by statutory elements, not by
what might be described in a looser sense as a unit of criminal
conduct.118 Consequentially, eliminating the dual-sovereignty rule
would do little to trim the reach of federal criminal law, and it would
not even prevent many successive state and federal prosecutions for
the same criminal conduct unless the system for defining an

powers “conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the Union;” and
between “the action of a part” and “the action of the whole” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. 316, 428–36 (1819))).
110. Id.
111. Id. (explaining that the people, by adopting the Constitution, “split the atom of
sovereignty” (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999))).
112. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, 245 (James Madison)).
113. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
114. Id. at 1990-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Id. at 1999–2000 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
115. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1968-69 (majority opinion). The majority indicates that
taxation is an example that comes immediately to mind.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1969.
118. Id. at 1980 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
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“offense” under double jeopardy was overruled.119
In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg notes that garnering support
from the international sphere is irrelevant in the case at hand because
Gamble was convicted in both Alabama and the United States,
jurisdictions that are not foreign to each other.120 While the majority
relies on precedent that spans as far back as 1922,121 Justice Ginsburg
urges the majority to stay away from, in her opinion, such “illadvised” decisions.122 Under her rationale, the United States and its
constituent States, unlike foreign nations, are “kindred systems,”
“parts of ONE WHOLE.”123 She explains that the United States and
its constituent States compose one people, bound by an overriding
Federal Constitution.124
Therefore, the Federal and State
Governments should be restricted from accomplishing together “what
neither government could do alone—prosecute an ordinary citizen
twice for the same offense.”125
Then, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine treats governments as sovereign, whereas, in the system
established by the Federal Constitution, “ultimate sovereignty”
resides in the governed.126 In contrast to Justice Alito’s argument that
the system of dual sovereignty allows separate sovereigns to each
have their own offense,127 Justice Ginsburg explains that the division
of authority between the United States and the States was intended to
operate as “a double security for the rights of the people,” not as a
mechanism to take away people’s rights.128 For Justice Ginsburg, the
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
121. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
122. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, 493 (Alexander Hamilton)).
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Amar & Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1995)).
126. Id. (citing Arizona State Leg. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 139 S. Ct.
2652, 2675 (2015); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 324–35 (1816)).
127. See supra note 100. (NOTE 100 IS JUST A CITATION TO GAMBLE. IS THIS
WHAT YOU ARE TRYING TO CROSS REFERENCE? DO YOU MEAN TEXT
ACCOMPANYING NOTE 100?) Veronica’s Response: I was citing to FN 100 because the
citation to Gamble in FN 100 is what I’m referencing. If it makes it easier, I am okay with
just having this FN read: Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1965. (NOTE: That change would make the
following footnote (128) just read: Id. at 1991 ... etc.).
128. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist No. 51,
323 (James Madison)); see Id. at 1994 (explaining that the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine
provides new opportunities for federal and state prosecutors to “join together to take a
second bite at the apple” (citing United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive, 66 F.3d
483, 498 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring))).

MINA (DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/21 1:17 PM

2020] DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE NAT’L VS. INT’L CONTEXT

269

Double Jeopardy Clause embodies a principle that is deeply
engrained in our system of justice.129 Lastly, Justice Ginsburg
explains that overruling the separate-sovereign doctrine would not
affect large numbers of cases.130
In a separate dissent, Justice Gorsuch argues that a free society
does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same
crime until it is happy with the punishment.131 In support of this
argument, Justice Gorsuch uses textualist132 and originalist
arguments.133 Textually, although the Double Jeopardy Clause is
silent about allowing “separate sovereigns” to sequentially do what
neither may do separately, the government assures the people that the
Fifth Amendment’s phrase “same offense” does this work.134 In an
originalist view, Justice Gorsuch argues that the government does not
identify any evidence suggesting that the framers understood the term
“same offense” to bear such a lawyerly sovereign-specific meaning.135
The Constitution as originally adopted and understood did not allow
successive state and federal prosecutions for the same offense.136 In
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, trying to explain the Court’s separate
sovereign rule to a criminal defendant, then or now, would be
absolutely absurd.137 Justice Gorsuch agrees with Justice Ginsburg,
129. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1991 (“[T]hat the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.” (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
187–88 (1957))).
130. Id. at 1995 (“Under the Petite policy adopted by the Department of Justice, the
Department will pursue a federal prosecution “based on substantially the same act(s) or
transaction(s)” previously prosecuted in state court only if the first prosecution left a
“substantial federal interest . . . demonstrably un-vindicated” and a Department senior
official authorizes the prosecution.” (quoting Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.031(A)
(rev. July 2009))).
131. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1996.
132. Id. at 1997 (explaining that two statutes can punish the same offense); see U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
133. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1997.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1998.
136. Id. at 2005.
137. Id. at 1999. Specifically, Justice Gorsuch states that one would have to explain the
following to a criminal defendant: yes, you were sentenced to state prison for being a felon
in possession of a firearm. And don’t worry – the State can’t prosecute you again for exactly
the same thing. What’s more, that federal prosecutor may work hand-in-hand with the same
state prosecutor who already went after you. They can share evidence and discuss what
worked and what didn’t the first time around. And the federal prosecutor can pursue you
even if you were acquitted in the state case. None of that offends the Constitution’s plain
words protecting a person from being placed “twice . . . in jeopardy of life or limb” for the
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that under the American Constitution, federal and state governments
are but two expressions of a single and sovereign people.138 For
Justice Gorsuch, today’s Court invokes federalism not to protect
individual liberty but to threaten it, allowing two governments to
achieve together an objective denied to each.139
Lastly, Justice Gorsuch cited support from foreign cases and
commentaries.140 The Framers to the Constitution compared the
relationship between Wales, Scotland, and England to their vision of
the relationship between the national government and the States, as
prosecutions in one of these countries barred subsequent prosecutions
for the same offense in the others.141 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent emphasized foreign countries’ disallowance of successive
prosecutions by different sovereigns—even sovereigns as foreign to
each other as England and Portugal—suggests that the American
federal system should likewise prohibit successive prosecutions by
federal and state governments with even greater force, given that both
governments derive their sovereignty from the American people.142
Although the United States allowed the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine to
exist, Justice Gorsuch insists that the Court not follow stare decisis

same offense.” Id.
138. Id. (“[T]he government of the Union . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of
the people,” and all sovereignty “emanates from them.” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 404–05 (1819))).
139. Id. at 2000 (explaining that the Court’s example—taxation, alcohol, and
marijuana—involve areas that the federal and state governments each may regulate
separately under the Constitution as interpreted by this Court).
140. See Beak v. Tyrhwhite, 3 Mod. 194, 87 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B., 1688) (holding that
acquittal in a foreign country followed by an attempted second prosecution in England was
impermissible); 2 Hawkins § 10, at 372 (“[T]hat an [a]cquittal in any Court whatsoever,
which has a [j]urisdiction of the [c]ause, is as good a [b]ar of any subsequent [p]rosecution
for the same [c]rime.”); H. Bathurst, Theory of Evidence 39 (“[A] final [d]etermination in a
[c]ourt having competent [j]urisdiction is conclusive in all [c]ourts of concurrent
[j]urisdiction.”); F. Buller, An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 241 (If
A. having killed a [p]erson in Spain was there prosecuted, tried, and acquitted, and
afterwards was indicted here in England, he might plead the [a]cquittal in Spain in [b]ar.”).
141. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2001–03 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, when an English
county indicted a defendant “for murder committed . . . in Wales,” it was barred from
proceeding when the court learned that the defendant had already been tried and acquitted
“of the same offense” in Wales.” (citing King v. Thomas, 1 Lev. 118 (K.B. 1664))); see also
Her Majesty’s Advocate v. MacGregor, Ark. 49, 60 (1846) (“In 1846, the Scottish High
Court of Justiciary declared that “if a man has been tried for theft in England, we would not
try him again here.”); see, e.g., A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 45 (2005);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton); John Jay, An Address to the People of the
State of New York, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 84 (P. Ford ed.
1788).
142. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 2002.
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blindly.143
IV. ANALYSIS
In Gamble v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a crime
under one sovereign’s law is not “the same offense” as a crime under
the laws of another sovereign—even when those sovereigns are the
American federal and state governments.144 The Court made the
incorrect judgment because it inaccurately construed the federal and
states’ sovereign powers in the United States.145 The Court’s
reasoning was flawed in part as it incorrectly explained the
sovereignty of foreign nations, which it used as support in upholding
the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.146 Both the majority and dissent give
plausible depictions of the creation of sovereignty in the United
States,147 yet the majority erroneously interpreted the idea of
sovereignty and jurisdiction in international law and made those
interpretations the “rule” for penalizing individuals under
international law.148
A. The Court’s Holding is Incorrect Because the Federal
Government and the State Government are not Distinct
Sovereigns in the United States
By nature, the idea of sovereignty in the United States will likely
never be resolved. There exists a deep ambiguity of sovereignty
because the history of the United States can be interpreted in different
ways, as evidenced by the competing interpretations between Justice
Alito and Justice Ginsburg in Gamble. However, the arguments for
one overarching sovereign federal government are strong.149 The
arguments for a sole sovereign power in the United States stems from
various sources: (1) the notion of preemption,150 (2) the argument that
states have power only because the federal government gave them
permission to have such power,151 (3) the concept of territoriality,152
143. Id. at 2006 (explaining that blind obedience to stare decisis would leave this Court
still abiding to “grotesque errors like Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and
Korematsu v. United States”).
144. Id. at 1963 (majority opinion).
145. See infra Section IV.A.
146. See infra Section IV.B.
147. See infra Section IV.A.
148. See infra Section IV.B.
149. See infra notes 151-53.
150. See infra note 203.
151. See infra note 207.
152. See infra note 211.
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(4) the powers that are reserved only for the federal government such
as those in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution,153 and
(5) the understanding that times have changed since the inception and
formation of the United States.154 I will begin with the last source in
order to explain how the view of state sovereignty started in the
United States, and then I will examine the other four sources listed
above in turn.
The notion of federalism is implicit in the structure of the United
States,155 in various State constitutions dating back to the inception of
the states’ formation,156 and in a long list of doctrinal history.157
Federalism is a model of government that has two separate and
independent layers of government: (1) a national government that, at
least in theory, has limited authority as spelled out in a Federal
constitution; and (2) separate state and local governments for each of
the sovereign states, each of which has more general powers as
limited by each state’s constitution.158 Essentially, federalism is a
question of how power, resources and responsibility should be
divided between the federal and state governments.159 James
Madison conceded to a system of federalism, explaining that, “Each
State, in ratifying its [c]onstitution, is considered as a sovereign body,
independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
act.” Madison also clarified the powers of the federal government:
“[T]he proposed government cannot be deemed a [national] one;
since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the several [s]tates a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects.”160
The issue of what sovereignty means has long preceded Justice
Alito and Justice Ginsburg’s debate. While the dissent takes the
position that, “The United States and its constituent States, unlike
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
154. See infra note 206.
155. See infra note 157.
156. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV.
371 (2016).
157. See infra notes 170-78; Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852); Cross v. North
Carolina, 132 U.S. 131 (1889); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893); Crossley v.
California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898); Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 13 (1903); United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Jerome v. United
States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
158. CHRISTOPHER B. POWER, ET AL., 36 E. & MIN. L. INST. 6, § 6.02 (2015).
159. Id. (citing Robert V. Percival, “Symposium: Environmental Federalism: Historical
Roots and Contemporary Models,” 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1995)).
160. Id.
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foreign nations, are ‘kindred systems,’ ‘parts of ONE WHOLE,’”161
the majority contends that although this is true, there is a difference
between the whole and a single part.162 The truth of the matter is that
both the majority and the dissent are correct.163 For example, three of
the four state constitutions adopted before July 4, 1776 – New Jersey,
New Hampshire, and South Carolina – identified the Continental
Congress as the governing body responsible for the life and death of
that governing charter.164 Moreover, New Hampshire and South
Carolina drafted and approved state constitutions only after
requesting permission and receiving a recommendation from the
Continental Congress to do so.165 These actions point to one
governing sovereign—the federal government, in which case Justice
Ginsburg is correct. However, unlike New Jersey, New Hampshire,
and South Carolina, Virginians made no lengthy reference to the
Continental Congress when justifying their decision to approve a new
state constitution.166 In fact, the initial Virginia constitution referred
to the state as a “country.”167 Given this finding, Justice Alito would
also be correct that the people did not confer all attributes of
sovereignty on a single government.168 In sum, the dissent and the
majority are telling a different story about the creation of sovereignty,
both of which explain one part that the other misses.169
161. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1990 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 82
(A. Hamilton)).
162. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion); see also supra note 109.
163. Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 371,
375 (2016) (“No state constitution takes a very clear position on whether the state was an
entirely independent sovereign that delegated certain powers to a federal union or whether
state sovereignty was limited to certain internal matters. All vest the state government with
some powers associated with national sovereignty, but not with others. Most state
constitutions refer to the Continental Congress or the United States, without clarifying the
nature of the relationship between the state and the United States. Most state constitutions
say nothing about the relationship between the States.”).
164. Id. at 378; see N.H. CONST. of 1776; N.J. CONST. of 1776.
165. Graber, supra note 164, at 379.
166. Id. at 380; see V.A. CONST. of 1776.
167. Graber, supra note 164, at 380.
168. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019).
169. Graber, supra note 164, at 390 (“No state plainly asserted that sovereignty vested
entirely in the Continental Congress, although New Hampshire came close. Likewise, no
state asserted that sovereignty vested entirely within the states, although Virginia came close.
States routinely insisted on retaining control over their internal police, but thought the
Continental Congress empowered to make treaties. No state declaration or instruction made
clear whether states had delegated power over external affairs to the Continental Congress or
whether that body had inherent powers to make treaties and determine military strategies.”);
Id. at 423 (“The federal Constitution clearly changed the balance of power between the states
and federal government, but the complete absence of any reference to that national
constitution in the seven state constitutions ratified from 1789 to 1793 belies any easy claim
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Justice Alito’s interpretation of sovereignty is inherently
grounded in the streams of cases that created and applied the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine. Several cases lead to the eventual creation of
the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine. In Alden v. Maine,170 the Court
recognized that the people, by adopting the Constitution, “split the
atom of sovereignty.”171 By “splitting the atom of sovereignty,” the
Founders established “two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”172 In
Gregory v. Ashcroft,173 the Supreme Court emphasized that, “[U]nder
our federal system, the states possess sovereignty concurrent with
that of the federal government, subject only to the limitations
imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”174 Justice O’Connor pointed out
that the Court had described the constitutional scheme of dual
sovereigns over 120 years ago.175 The Constitution created a federal
government of limited powers and those powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.176 Moreover,
Justice Alito points out that cases as early as McCulloch v.
Maryland177 admitted to a system of dual sovereignty.178
The Court truly began setting the doctrine’s foundation in its
1820 opinion Houston v. Moore.179 Houston challenged his state
court conviction on the ground that his offense violated the laws of
the United States therefore, he could only be punished under federal
that a consensus had formed on the sovereign status of states.”).
170. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
171. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 751 (1999)).
172. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504,
n. 17 (1999)).
173. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
174. Id. at 457 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)).
175. Id. (“The people of each [s]tate compose a [s]tate, having its own government, and
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence . . . The
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to the indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible [s]tates.” (quoting Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869))).
176. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X).
177. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
178. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1968 (2019) (“Chief Justice Marshall
distinguished precisely between “the people of a State” and “[t]he people of all the States,”
(citing 17 U.S. at 428, 435); between the “sovereignty which the people of a single state
possess” and the sovereign powers “conferred by the people of the United States on the
government of the Union,” (citing 17 U.S. at 429–30); and thus between “the action of a
part” and “the action of the whole,” (citing 17 U.S. at 435–36)).
179. 18 U.S. 1 (1820).
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laws, and cannot be punished under the laws of his own State.”180
The Court rejected this argument, explaining that, “Every citizen of a
state owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and
participates in the government of both the State and the United
States.”181 To explain the presence of dual sovereignty, the Court
gave the example of a highway mail robbery: this would be
recognized as a highway robbery under state laws and a federal
offense under U.S. law.182
In 1847, the Court affirmed the notion of dual sovereignty in
Fox v. Ohio.183 The defendant challenged her state conviction for
passing counterfeit coin on the grounds that only the federal
government had jurisdiction over that offense.184 The court dismissed
the challenge by distinguishing counterfeiting, which was an offense
exclusively within the power of the Congress to proscribe, and
passing counterfeit coin, which was a fraud punishable under state
law.185 Just three years later in United States v. Marigold,186 the Court
affirmed Fox’s concurrent jurisdiction holding, explaining that the
states and Congress each had independent jurisdiction to prosecute
and punish uttering false currency.187
Just two years later, Moore v. Illinois188 solidified the
jurisdictional foundation laid by Houston, Fox and Marigold. The
defendant challenged his state conviction under an Illinois law
outlawing harboring fugitive slaves, claiming that such conviction
resulted in double jeopardy since the federal government already
prosecuted him under the Fugitive Slave Act.189 In response to the
double jeopardy challenge, the Court announced the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine.190

180. Id. at 33.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 34.
183. 46 U.S. 410 (1847).
184. Id. at 433 (insisting that the Ohio statute is repugnant to the fifth and sixth clauses of
the eight section of the first article of the [C]onstitution, which invest Congress with the
power to coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and to provide for the
punishment of counterfeiting the current coin of the United States).
185. Id.
186. 50 U.S. 560 (1850).
187. Id. at 569–70.
188. 55 U.S. 13 (1852).
189. Id. at 14, 17.
190. Id. at 19–20 (“An offense, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a
law. . . . Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be
said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns. And may be liable to punishment for an infraction
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The first true and full application of the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine came seventy years later in United States v. Lanza.191 The
Court explained that each state and Congress may exercise an
independent judgment in selecting and shaping measures to enforce
their own laws, whereby the laws adopted by Congress become laws
of the United States and the laws adopted by a State become laws of
that State.”192 In its first true application of the Doctrine, the Court
justified its holding by explicitly using independent prescriptive
jurisdiction to determine offenses.193
Doctrinal history thus far has overwhelmingly supported Justice
Alito’s explanation of sovereignty in the United States. Only in
particular cases will the Court not apply the Dual Sovereignty
Doctrine and rule that the Double Jeopardy clause applies to bar
successive prosecutions. One instance where the double jeopardy
clause would apply to bar a successive federal prosecution is when
state courts are empowered to apply United States federal law, i.e.,
“where jurisdiction is vested in the State Courts by statutory
provisions of the United States.”194
The Court has also been unwilling to find a dual sovereignty
exception to double jeopardy where it has stressed the absence of an
independent prescriptive jurisdiction by each prosecuting entity, and
has emphasized that both entities draw their jurisdiction from the
same lawgiving “source.”195 For example, in Grafton v. United
States,196 the Court held that a homicide prosecution by military court
martial foreclosed a successive prosecution for the same homicide by
the civil justice system in the then-U.S. territory of the Philippines.
In doing so, the Court explained that if a person is tried in a tribunal
that gets its jurisdiction and authority from the United States, and is
acquitted or convicted, he cannot be tried again for the same offense
in another tribunal that gets its jurisdiction and authority from the

of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both
. . . . That either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted.
Yet it cannot be truly averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offense;
but only that by one act he has committed two offenses, for each of which he is justly
punishable. He could not plead the punishment in one in bar to a conviction by the other.”).
191. 260 U.S. 377 (1922); see supra pp. 10–11.
192. 260 U.S. at 381.
193. Id.
194. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 35 (1820).
195. Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional
Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 788 (2009).
196. 206 U.S. 333, 351 (1909).
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United States.”197 The court martial prosecuted Grafton for homicide
as defined by the Penal Code of the Philippines and because he
applied the civil law definition of homicide, the Court found that a
successive civil court prosecution was “for the identical offense.”198
While Justice Ginsburg correctly points out one view of
sovereignty, her view does not make Justice Alito’s view any less
incorrect as far as the history of the United States concerns. Both the
majority and the dissent accurately present valid theories of the
creation of sovereignty—one being a federalism theory of
sovereignty and the other a liberty theory of sovereignty (that
sovereignty resides with the people and the state and federal
government are part of one whole). The theories of how sovereignty
was created in the United States can co-exist since there has yet to be
one absolute explanation of the creation of sovereignty, evidenced
heavily by the different paths states took to becoming independent.199
Some states took a liberty approach and others a federalist approach;
however, their reasoning for each specific path remains unknown.200
Although the notion of sovereignty during the inception of the
United States led to the creation and subsequent application of the
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as seen above, the view and
understanding of sovereignty in the United States has changed
significantly. The idea of sovereignty was revolutionized through
concepts of preemption, territoriality and residual sovereignty. While
the states in the United States retain significantly more internal
autonomy than other federalist countries around the world, the states
are still subservient to the federal government.201 The Supremacy
Clause is a clause within Article IV202 of the United States
Constitution, which dictates that federal law is the “supreme law of
the land.”203 This means that judges in every state must follow the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the federal government in matters
197. Id. at 352.
198. Id. at 349. Since the military court marital and the territorial civil court derived
jurisdiction from the United States government, and thus necessarily prosecuted for a crime
against the laws of the United States, “a second trial of the accused for that crime in the same
or another court, civil or military, of the same government” violated double jeopardy. Id. at
352.
199. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV.
371, 387–89 (2016) (“The different paths states took to independence in 1776 suggest that
states disputed the location of sovereignty in the Americas.”).
200. Id. at 397.
201. See U.S. CONST. Article VI.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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that are directly or indirectly within the government’s control. Under
the doctrine of preemption, which is based on the Supremacy Clause,
federal law preempts state law even when the laws conflict. Thus, a
federal court may require a state to stop certain behavior it believes
interferes with, or is in conflict with, federal law. The notion of
preemption cedes to the premise of one overarching sovereign power
in the United States.
Regardless of the different paths that states took to becoming
independent, the truth is that the states no longer retain the
sovereignty that Justice Alito’s originalist view would have one
believe. States are no longer viewed as sovereign but rather they are
autonomous agents.204 While Justice Alito essentially attempts to
argue that states are still sovereign because at one point states were
sovereign, that is simply not the case anymore. States today cannot
delegate war or send troops to war because that power is reserved
solely for Congress.205 Moreover, powers such as coining money,
regulating interstate and foreign commerce, regulating the mail,
declaring armies, conducting foreign affairs, establishing inferior
courts and establishing rules of naturalization are all exclusive
powers of the federal government.206 Any power not listed to the
federal government is left to the states or the people by the Tenth
Amendment, which likens states to more of autonomous agents rather
than sovereign agents.207 To the extent that there are dual sovereigns,
the sovereignty is between the states, such as in Heath v. Alabama,
but not so much between the state and federal governments. Missouri
v. Holland further settled the notion of dual sovereignty, explaining
that the civil war settled that states at best retained residual
sovereignty.208 Sovereignty may rest in the people but the federal
government ultimately represents the people.209 In addition to the
concepts of preemption and residual sovereignty, the concept of
territoriality also works to eradicate the idea of dual sovereignty. In
the international sphere, we generally define nation states as actors
204. See infra note 207.
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
206. The relationship between the states and the federal government, KHAN ACADEMY,
(last visited Apr. 29, 2020) https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-government-andcivics/us-gov-foundations/us-gov-relationship-between-the-states-and-the-federalgovernment/a/relationship-between-the-states-and-the-federal-government-article.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
208. See infra notes 256-57.
209. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1999 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he government of the Union . . . is emphatically, and truly, a government of the
people,” and all sovereignty “emanates from them.” (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat
316, 404–05 (1819))).
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that have power over their own territory,210 whereas states in the
United States share territory with the federal government and the
federal government has supreme access to that territory.211 These
concepts of preemption, territoriality and residual sovereignty give
way to the notion of one supreme and overarching sovereign in the
United States: the federal government.
B. The Court Improperly Used an International Analogy as
Support by Incorrectly Explaining the Notion of
Jurisdiction in the International Sphere
Before analyzing the misplaced international analogies used by
Justice Alito, it is worth noting briefly the great irony in Gamble: that
Justice Alito has come to take great care for international law while
Justice Ginsburg, a scholar and advocate for international law and
human rights, has taken a backseat to the use of international law and
alternatively, advocates for its irrelevance in the case at hand. Justice
Alito misuses two international examples for support in Gamble v.
United States. First—If a United States national was murdered in
another country, that country could rightfully seek to punish the killer
for committing an act of violence within its territory.212 Justice Alito
argues that customary international law allows the concurrent
exercise of United States jurisdiction since the murder of a United
States national is also an offense to the United States, which in turn,
supports his argument that the killing of an American abroad is a
federal offense that can be prosecuted in American courts.213
Second—crimes that might do harm to the United States’ national
security or foreign relations can be punished by the other country and
the United States.214 The reason for this is because acts such as
terrorism and bombings are covered under international jurisdiction,
which requires no nexus to establish jurisdiction.215
Justice Alito mischaracterized the international examples based
on the concept of jurisdiction in the international sphere. There are
210. What is a “State”?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/nationsa-states/what-is-a-state.html (“A state is the means of rule over a defined or “sovereign”
territory.”).
211. Rob Natelson, What Does the Constitution Say About Federal Land Ownership?,
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE (Feb. 6, 2016), https://i2i.org/what-does-the-constitution-sayabout-federal-land-ownership/.
212. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1967 (explaining that the foreign country’s interest lies in
protecting the peace in that territory rather than protecting the American specifically).
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (bombings)).
215. See infra notes 237-38.
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two kinds of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law—“national
jurisdiction” and “international jurisdiction.”216 National jurisdiction
derives from “independent entitlements of each individual state vis-àvis other states in the international system to make and apply its own
law—principally, from entitlements over national territory and
persons.”217 International jurisdiction derives from “a state’s shared
entitlement – along with all other states as members of the
international system – to enforce international law.”218 These two
kinds of jurisdictions ultimately represent two different kinds of
“sovereigns” for double jeopardy purposes—one national and the
other international.219
Under all of the foregoing principles, a state requires a nexus to
the first state’s national entitlements.220 When discussing “national
jurisdiction,” State A has jurisdiction over State A territory because of
State A’s national entitlement, as recognized by international law,
over its territory.221 A state is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over its
territory when the activity comes in reach of a State’s subjective
territoriality222 (activity that occurs, even in part, within its territory)
or objective territoriality223 (activity that does not occur but has an
effect within its territory). Moreover, a state can claim jurisdiction
over activity that involves its nationals.224 The latter exercise of
jurisdiction is critical to understand given Justice Alito’s use of
international support. “Where the acts in question are committed by
a state’s nationals, the state may claim active personality jurisdiction.
And where the acts victimize a state’s nationals, the state may claim
passive personality jurisdiction.”225
Additionally, under the
protective principle, a state may claim jurisdiction over activity that
is directed against the state’s security and/or its ability to carry out
216. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 790.
217. Id. (“We might think of national courts exercising national jurisdiction and applying
national law in the international system as roughly analogous to the United States state
courts applying their own state’s law in the United States federal system.”).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 793 (“For instance, absent some nexus, Germany may not apply its racial hate
speech laws to speech by United States nationals, speaking only in the United States and
having no connection to Germany.” (citing Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International
Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 121, 169–75 (2007))).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 794 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS: SELECTED TOPICS
IN TREATIES, JURISDICTION, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY § 402(1)(a) (2018)).
223. Id. (citing § 402(1)(c)).
224. Id. (citing § 402(2)).
225. Id. (citing § 402 (2) cmt. g.).
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official state functions.226
While one might think that the passive personality principle
justifies Justice Alito’s example of the murder of a United States
national, that is incorrect. Passive personality principle exists in
international law but it does not exist in United States domestic
law.227 Passive personality principle does not give American states
jurisdiction, because if that were so, then the United States would be
prosecuting foreign nationals on their own territory. If a United
States citizen is murdered in a foreign country, the United States
cannot extend its laws to prosecute the murderer unless the United
States asserts some specific jurisdictional authority to do so. In
essence, the United States can follow United States murderers in
foreign countries, but not United States murder victims. For
example, if a United States national is killed in France, the United
States cannot enforce its own murder statute in France under
international law.228 The one exception to this is the crime of
terrorism or crimes known as jus cogens – crimes against humanity,
both of which are recognized as a universal jurisdictional offense.229
The other type of jurisdiction is international jurisdiction. This
type of jurisdiction requires no nexus at all because the basis is
universal jurisdiction.230 “The very commission of certain crimes
denominated universal under international law engenders jurisdiction
for all states irrespective of where the crimes occur or which state’s
nationals are involved.”231 No nexus is required because states have
jurisdictional power purely from the international legal system’s
interest in suppressing certain international crimes no matter where
they occur and whom they involve, thereby having the states act as
decentralized enforcement vehicles for the international legal
226. Id. (citing §402 (3)).
227. Hariharan Kumar, Passive Personality Principle: An Overview, ACADEMIKE (Feb. 6,
2015),
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/passive-personality-principle-overview/
(“Under the passive personality (or victim) theory, a State has prescriptive jurisdiction over
anyone anywhere who injures its nationals. Jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the
victim. The United States however does not recognize this theory generally - despite its
recitation in certain cases – and there is a doubt whether more than handful of other States
actually accepts it as a valid principle of customary international law.”).
228. See supra note 227.
229. See infra notes 237-38.
230. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 794.
231. Id. (“Thus while a state may not, without a nexus to its national entitlements, extend
its national prescriptive reach into the territories of other states, international law extends
everywhere and without limitation the international prohibition on universal crimes.” (citing
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149
(2007))).
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system.232
Justice Alito’s two prime uses of international support are
deceptive, because in each case, Justice Alito has explicitly either
ignored the concept of jurisdiction in international law or taken an
exception under international law and made it the rule by using
crimes that are deemed to be covered by universal jurisdiction.233 In
Justice Alito’s first example, the murder of a United States national in
a foreign country bestows jurisdiction on the foreign country and the
United States.234 However, that has turned out to be explicitly
incorrect by virtue of the lack of a passive personality principle in
United States domestic law.235 In Justice Alito’s second example, he
cites 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b), which grants the United States
jurisdiction when its own national security or foreign relations are
threatened.236 In reality, the United States would have jurisdiction in
cases involving weapons of mass destruction or crimes of terrorism
because international law recognizes terrorism as a universal
jurisdictional offense.237 “It is the international nature of the crime –
its very substance and definition under international law – that gives
rise to jurisdiction for all states.”238 Ironically enough, it is important
to consider that the issue at hand in Gamble is a charge of possession
of a firearm. Therefore, for Justice Alito to use an analogy of
terrorism in the international sphere to support his argument about a
case concerning possession of a firearm is far-fetched and misplaced
at best. Justice Alito’s analysis of sovereignty is also ironic in the
respect that as a conservative, he is supporting the idea of splitting
sovereignty between two governments rather than advocating for
sovereignty lying with the people. These ironies give support to the
idea that dual sovereignty in the United States is a legal fiction.
Justice Alito misleads individuals to believe that regardless of
the crime that occurs in one nation, the other foreign nation can get
jurisdiction as well by handpicking those certain crimes that fall
under international law to support his idea of sovereignty in the
international sphere. In international law, sovereignty is not used as a
232. Id. at 797.
233. See infra note 237.
234. See supra note 213.
235. See supra note 227.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(b) (bombings).
237. Colangelo, supra note 195, at 794 (“The category of universal crime . . . is now
generally considered to include serious international human rights and humanitarian law
violations like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and most recently,
certain crimes of terrorism.”).
238. Id.
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power mechanism, but rather as a limitation on power for all states.239
For example, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
limits subsequent prosecutions after a county has already prosecuted
that individual, understanding the concerns of fairness to the accused,
individual human rights, and the protection of the integrity of the
judicial system.240
This statute in international law directly
contradicts Justice Alito’s application and view of sovereignty in the
international sphere. Justice Alito distorted the view of sovereignty
in the international sphere by using it as a power mechanism for
states, which is exactly the unintended and antithetical consequence
of the purpose of sovereignty in international law.241 In sum, his use
of international support in Gamble is deceptive and inaccurate.
C. Sovereignty v. Autonomy
Justice Alito’s opinion inherently imputes an investigation into
the states’ sovereign powers. The 10th Amendment errs on the side of
states being autonomous.242 Per the 10th Amendments reading, the
states retain a residual sovereignty—they receive all the powers that
are left over from the federal government and not delegated
specifically to the federal government.243 However, Justice Alito’s
opinion errs on the side of states being sovereign rather than being
autonomous.244 Justice Alito uses Heath v. Alabama245 to strengthen
his view of state sovereignty. Heath had hired two men in Georgia to
kidnap and kill his wife, which they did—kidnapping her in Alabama
and killing her in Georgia.246 He was prosecuted for homicide in
Georgia and pleaded guilty in exchange for a life sentence to avoid

239. See infra note 241.
240. Lorraine Finlay, Does the International Criminal Court Protect against Double
Jeopardy:
An
Analysis
of
Article
20
of
the
Rome
Statute,
15 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 226 (2009). Article 20 of the Rome Statute, in
part, states: Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with
respect to conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted
or acquitted by the Court. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in
article 5 for which that person has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court. No
person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7, or
8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless [. . . ].
241. Id.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
243. See supra notes 207, 242.
244. See supra note 97.
245. Heath, 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
246. Id. at 83–84.
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the death penalty.247 Alabama then prosecuted him for the same
homicide, convicting him and sentencing him to death.248 Heath
argued to the Supreme Court that almost all of the activity relating to
the crime took place in Georgia, thus Alabama overreached its
constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over the events that
occurred in Georgia.249 The United States Supreme Court agreed with
the Alabama Supreme Court that, “[i]f for double jeopardy purposes,
Alabama is considered to be a sovereign entity vis-à-vis the federal
government then surely it is a sovereign entity vis-à-vis the State of
Georgia.”250 The Court further explained that Heath’s acts violated
the “peace and dignity” of Georgia and Alabama, two separate
sovereigns, by breaking the laws of each.251 Thus he had committed
two distinct offenses.252
However, Justice Alito’s view of state sovereignty is still
undermined by cases such as Missouri v. Holland.253 In Missouri, the
United States entered a treaty with Great Britain to prohibit the
killing of migratory birds that traveled between the United States and
Canada, since the birds were in danger of extinction.254 Missouri
argued that the 10th Amendment prohibits the United States from
exercising powers that are reserved to the States since the power to
prohibit the killing of migratory birds was not delegated to the United
States.255 However, the Court held that because Article 2, Section 2
expressly grants the United States the power to make treaties and
Article 6 guarantees that treaties made under the authority of the
United States are declared the supreme law of the land in cases where
state law conflicts, the fact that Missouri claims they can regulate
migratory birds is not enough to override the overarching power of
Article 6.256 Missouri in essence eradicates state sovereignty by
explaining that all acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
whenever states’ law conflicts, regardless of what powers were
reserved or delegated to the states.257 What Missouri further
247. Id.
248. Id. at 85–86.
249. Id. at 85–87.
250. Id. at 86 (citing Ex Parte Heath, 455 So. 2d 905, 906 (Ala. 1984)).
251. Id. at 88 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).
252. Id.
253. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
254. Id. at 431–32.
255. Id. at 432 (“It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution”).
256. Id. (“As most of the laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as
many of them deal with matters which in the silence of such laws the State might regulate,
such general grounds are not enough to support Missouri’s claim”).
257. Id. at 433.
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emphasizes is the concept of preemption.258
V. CONCLUSION
In Gamble v. United States, the Court upheld the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine, explaining that a state may prosecute a
defendant under state law even if the federal government has
prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute, and the
reverse.259 The Court incorrectly decided the case because although
both, Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg argue a valid theory of the
creation of sovereignty in the United States, Justice Ginsburg’s
picture of sovereignty is more consistent with the evolution of
sovereignty today. Moreover, Justice Alito incorrectly explained the
meaning of sovereignty in the international sphere and how
international law perceives sovereignty.
Moving forward, to better protect American citizen’s rights
against Double Jeopardy, the federal government should be
encouraged to adhere to the Petite Policy260 when cases of potential
double jeopardy arise. The policy constructs a barrier against
successive federal prosecutions where the defendant has already been
tried in state court for the same criminal activity.261 The Department
of Justice will only pursue a federal prosecution “based on
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s)” previously prosecuted
in state court if the first prosecution left a “substantial federal interest
demonstrably unvindicated.”262 The purpose of the Petite Policy is to
institutionalize deference to prior prosecutions for the same activity
by other sovereigns but to also protect defendants from having to
endure multiple prosecutions unless those interests are compelling.263
This policy exists to protect the sovereign’s interests while not
putting the interests of those they were elected to represent on the
backburner.

258. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)
(explaining when state law can be preempted by federal law); see supra note 207.
259. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1964. SHORT CITE – DONE.
260. The policy was named after Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
261. The policy applied whenever there has been a prior state or federal prosecution
resulting in an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement, or a
dismissal or other termination of the case on the merits after jeopardy has attached. Dept. of
Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual § 9-2.031(C) (Dual and
Successive Prosecution Policy (“Petite Policy”)).
262. Id. at § 9-2.031(A); Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1995 (J. Ginsburg, dissenting)..
263. Id. at §9-2.031(A).

